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SYNOPSIS
This article addresses whether U.S. Constitutional law permits IP
rights in Traditional Cultural Expressions (TCEs). I conclude that such
rights are permissive, but only in a limited manner. Copyright-like
rights must be limited in duration, and other rights based on trademark
law must only apply to TCEs in commerce. Finally, a robust fair use
exception is necessary to avoid First Amendment Infringement.
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INTRODUCTION
In Early 2012, the Navajo Nation filed a lawsuit in U.S. District
Court in New Mexico against the popular clothing retailer Urban
Outfitters for the retailer's unauthorized use of the Navajo name and
traditional Navajo patterns.' The Navajo Nation described Urban
Outfitter's Navajo products as "derogatory and scandalous."2
This dispute is part of an ongoing concern involving the
appropriation by western cultures of the traditional cultural
expressions (TCEs) of indigenous societies throughout the world.
Scholars and international organizations have been considering
solutions that would provide various forms of intellectual property (IP)
protections for TCEs. Much of the discussion up to this point has been
whether or not it is a good idea to implement such protections, and, if
so, to what extent. Unsurprisingly, conclusions on this discussion vary
widely, with some scholars arguing that human rights implores strong
protections,3 and with others suggesting that TCE protections simply
cannot be justified by standard property justifications. 4 As this
discussion has unfolded, the World Intellectual Property Organization
(WIPO) has been working through its Traditional Knowledge (TK)
group to promote the rights of indigenous communities and is
attempting to draft an international instrument that would provide the
protections that indigenous communities seek for their TCEs.
Whether or not TCE protection is a good idea, it has yet to be
implemented throughout most of the world despite an expansive trend
in IP. This suggests that there is another question to be asked: Can
current legal regimes support such protections? Unlike previous
scholarship that has focused on whether TCEs shouldbe protected, this
article addresses whether TCEs can be protected. I approach the issue
from the perspective of U.S. Constitutional law to determine if there is
room for TCE protection in the United States. My claim is that the U.S.
Constitution places significant limits on the forms of protection
available within the United States, and I conclude that although it is
possible to implement certain protections for TCEs, those protections
1 See Corporate Watch, WALL STREET JOURNAL (Feb. 29, 2012), available at
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052970203986604577253662877375738.html.
2 id.
3 See generally, Madhavi Sunder, The Invention of Traditional Knowledge, 70
LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 97 (2007).
4 See generally, Stephen R. Munzer and Kal Raustiala, The Uneasy Case for
Intellectual Property Rights in Traditional Knowledge, 27 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J.
37 (2009) (applying various justifications for property rights to traditional knowledge,
and concluding that the justifications are unworkable).
5 See World Intellectual Property Org., Traditional Cultural Expressions,
http://www.wipo.int/tk/en/folklore/ (last visited Oct. 1, 2013).
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cannot be as robust as most have thus far proposed, and they must exist
only for a limited duration or be applied only to TCEs used in
commerce. Part I of this paper will describe the background of the TCE
movement with a description of the solutions that have been proposed
by various outlets. Part 1I will analyze the various solutions under a
Constitutional lens by considering whether TCE protection can be
justified by the IP Clause or the Commerce Clause of the U.S.
Constitution, and, if so, whether these protections would be limited by
First Amendment rights. Finally, Part III will provide an outline of a
limited TCE solution that would be workable based on the
justifications and limitations discussed in the previous part. This article,
admittedly, takes a U.S.-centric approach. I do not mean to suggest that
this is the best approach to this issue, but that it is more workable in the
United States than other proposals.
I. BACKGROUND
A. Definition of Traditional Cultural Expressions
Traditional Cultural Expressions are a subset of a broader idea
known as Traditional Knowledge (TK). TK is generally understood to
be knowledge that is "refined and passed . . . from generation to
generation," within a community, and "is often an important part of
their cultural identities." 6 Some examples include knowledge of
biodiversity and traditional medicinal cures and treatments, folklore,
traditional dances, and spiritual symbols or patterns. TCE, more
specifically, is the non-scientific branch of TK, and examples of TCEs
are very diverse. TCE, or folklore, can be defined as "traditional
customs, tales, sayings, dances, or art forms preserved among a
people."8 Generally, all forms of TCE share three characteristics: "(1)
TCE is passed from generation to generation, either orally or through
imitation; (2) TCE is generally not attributable to any individual author
or set of authors; and (3) TCE is being continuously utilized and
developed within the indigenous community."9 The World Intellectual
Property Organization has developed a more comprehensive definition
6 Peter K. Yu, Traditional Knowledge, Intellectual Property, and Indigenous
Culture: An Introduction, 11 CARDOZO J. INT'L & COMP. L. 239 (2003).
7 Paul Kuruk, Protecting Folklore Under Modern Intellectual Property Regimes:
A Reappraisal of the Tensions Between Individual and Communal Rights in Africa
and the United States, 48 AM. U. L. REV. 769, 776 (1999).
8 THE MIRIAM-WEBSTER DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2014).
9 Christine Haight Farley, Protecting Folklore of Indigenous Peoples: Is
Intellectual Property the Answer?, 30 CONN. L. REv. 1, 5 (1997) (citing U.N. ESCOR,
Committee of Governmental Experts on the Safeguarding of Folklore, 16 Copyright
Bull. 27,37 (1982)).
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of TCE in its Revised Draft Provisions for the Protection of Traditional
Cultural Expressions/Expressions of Folklore ("WIPO Draft
Proposal"), describing TCEs as:
any forms, whether tangible [or] intangible, in which
traditional culture and knowledge are expressed, appear or
are manifested, and comprise the following forms of
expressions or combinations thereof:
(i) verbal expression, such as: stories, epics, legends,
poetry, riddles, and other narratives; words, signs,
names, and symbols;
(ii) musical expressions, such as songs and instrumental
music;
(iii) expressions by action, such as dances, plays,
ceremonies, rituals and other performances, whether
or not reduced to a material form; and
(iv) tangible expressions, such as productions of art, in
particular, drawings, designs, paintings (including
body-painting), carvings, sculptures, pottery,
terracotta, mosaic, woodwork, metalware, jewelry,
baskets, needlework, textiles, glassware, carpets,
costumes; handicrafts; musical instruments; and
architectural forms;
which are:
(aa) the products of creative intellectual activity, including
individual and communal creativity;
(bb) characteristic of a community's cultural and social
identity and cultural heritage; and
(cc) maintained, used or developed by such community, or
by individuals having the right or responsibility to do
so in accordance with the customary law and practices
of that community.10
This definition is very broad and opens the door to many
communities to seek protections for many forms of expression. This
broad understanding of TCEs informs how scholars think about the
breadth of protections for TCEs, and the methods in which that
protection may be achieved.
10 WIPO, Revised Draft Provisions for the Protection of Traditional Cultural
Expressions/Expressions of Folklore, § III, Art. 1, in WIPO/GRTKF/IC/9/4 (January
9, 2006) [hereinafter WIPO Draft], available at http://WIPO/GRTKF/IC/9/4 (January
9,2006).
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B. Breadth of Protection
Within indigenous communities, TCEs are frequently protected
by the norms of those communities." In some instances, only
individuals who are trained and approved by elders within the
community are permitted to reproduce various TCEs, and some
particularly sacred expressions are sometimes only permitted to be
viewed by certain individuals or during certain ceremonies.12 However,
without worldwide restrictions that govern beyond the jurisdiction of
the indigenous communities, these communal norms are inadequate to
protect TCEs from exploitation that could be offensive to the creators
of the TCEs. Accordingly, up to now, the "controversy [has been] over
whether, and, if so, how to grant protection to TK as a matter of
international and national law." 13
One concern for TCE protection is whether laws should provide
greater protection to TCEs that have greater spiritual value. 14
Obviously, indigenous groups would prefer the greatest possible
protections for their most valuable TCEs, but such subjective
determinations may prove difficult.' 5 On the one hand, heightened
protections for more valuable TCEs would further protect and promote
a cultural diversity that is essential to the human rights of indigenous
communities,1 6 but on the other hand, differentiating based on spiritual
or religious grounds could theoretically present serious constitutional
issues in select cases.
Another distinction exists as to whether TCE protections should
exist as offensive rights, or as defensive rights, or as both. Offensive
rights would provide protections to indigenous communities who wish
to exploit their TCEs commercially, whereas defensive rights would be
designed to prevent TCEs from being used in a manner that would
offend the indigenous community.17 Proponents of offensive rights
1 Munzer and Raustiala, supra note 4, at 39.
12 Farley, supra note 9, at 5.
13 Munzer and Raustiala, supra note 4, at 39.
14 Srividhya Ragavan, Protection of TraditionalKnowledge, 2 MINN. INTELL. PROP.
REV. 1, 16 (2001).
15 id.
16 See, e.g., Laurence R. Helfer, Toward a Human Rights Framework for
Intellectual Property, 40 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 971, 1002-07 (2007) (discussing cultural
diversity, the "common heritage of humanity," as it pertains to intellectual property
rights under the UNESCO Convention on the Protection and Promotion of the
Diversity of Cultural Expressions).
17 See Farley, supra note 9, at 14 (explaining that there are two different sets of
concerns: realists' concerns, which focus on economic gain for the indigenous
community; and traditionalists' concerns, which focus on preventing unauthorized uses
of the TCEs.).
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"want to be able to benefit from the economic rights provided by
intellectual property laws. Proponents want to be compensated for
their contribution to the artwork through licensing, and they want to
exclude non-indigenous competitors from the market by preventing
unauthentic products from being marketed as made by indigenous
people."18 Proponents of defensive rights, on the contrary, "want to use
intellectual property laws to prevent what may be characterized as a
cultural or psychological harm caused by the unauthorized use of their
art . . . They want to be able to restrict its dissemination and, in some
cases, prevent dissemination altogether."19 These two rights are not
mutually exclusive. In fact, current copyright laws already provide both
offensive and defensive rights that allow copyright holders to control
dissemination of their works and derivatives of such works, and
economically exploit their works however they see fit.20 At the same
time, however, it might be possible to establish TCE protections that
satisfy one of these perspectives while impeding the other.2 1
The distinction between these two groups is important because it
affects how various protections fit within the confines of the U.S.
Constitution. Therefore, the goals of these two groups will be discussed
below, as they pertain to each of the forms of protection that have been
proposed as solutions to establishing TCE rights.
C Proposed Methods of Protection
Most proposals for TCE protection center around already-existing
intellectual property regimes, including copyright law, trademark law,
and trade secret law. Other proposals seek a new sui generis form of
protection, or a combination of rights from each of these regimes. Each
method of protection will be discussed in turn.
1. Copyight Protection for TCEs
Because current copyright laws provide rights so similar to those
sought by proponents of both offensive and defensive TCE protections,
copyright is the first natural solution of all who seek national and
international TCE protections. Copyright law provides authors with the
exclusive right reproduce a work, 22 to create derivative works based on
18 id
19 Id
20 See generally, 17 U.S.C. § 106 (2012).
21 Farley, supra note 9, at 15.
22 17 U.S.C. § 106(1) (2012).
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the original,23 and to control the distribution of a work,24 among other
rights. Therefore, if TCEs were included among the copyrightable
subject matter, the creators of the work would have most, if not all, of
the protections they need to economically exploit their own works or
to prevent dissemination or reproduction of works that would be
offensive to the indigenous community. 25
In addition to protecting economic rights of authors and other
creators, copyright law provides moral rights. These rights include
divulgation, paternity, and integrity. 26 These rights could provide a
certain economic advantage by requiring that indigenous works are
properly attributed,27 but the primary result of moral rights would
support the defensive advocates. With strong moral rights for TCEs,
indigenous groups could prevent the distortion and wrongful use of
their expressions.28
Unfortunately, current copyright laws present a number of
barriers that would have to be changed in a law designed to protect
TCEs. First, copyright requires originality and fixation in a "tangible
medium of expression" for protection, 29 but many forms of TCE are
presented orally and passed from generation to generation, and
therefore fail to satisfy these requirement. 30 Further, most TCEs have
been in existence for many generations, but copyright law only exists
for a limited duration. 31 A limited duration protection might be
satisfactory to offensive TCE protection advocates; it would not be
satisfactory to the defensive group, which seeks perpetual protections,
and copyright certainly does not provide perpetual protection to any
works.32 Further, there is also the problem of the public domain: Most,
if not all, TCE materials are already considered to be a part of the
public domain and are currently used freely by anyone.33 Finally, some
scholars have noted that the group ownership of TCE rights sought by
indigenous groups presents a problem, but the work-for-hire and joint
23 17 U.S.C. § 106(2) (2012).
24 17 U.S.C. § 106(3) (2012).
25 Farley, supra note 9, at 16.
26 Id. at 48.
27 id
28 id.
29 17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (2012)
30 Farley, supra note 9, at 18-29.
31 The U.S. Constitution requires that exclusive rights of authors be secured for
limited times. See U.S. Const. art. 1, § 8, Cl. 8. Furthermore, the Copyright Act
currently only provides protection for the life of the author plus 70 years. See 17 U.S.C.
§ 302(a) (2012). Such a duration would exclude most TCEs from protection.
32 See Ragavan, supra note 14, at 19 ("copyright will not recognize any form of
perpetual protection that is needed to protect the originality of the folk material").
3 id
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works concepts evidence that group ownership is a possibility. 34
Ultimately, in order to provide copyright-like protection to TCEs, a
modified statute is necessary.
2 Trademarks and Geographical Indicators as TCE Protection
A second form of protection that would satisfy some proponents
of TCE protections is the use of trademarks or geographical indicators
(GI) in relation to TCEs. In some respects, this form of protection
already exists in a limited manner within the United States. The Indian
Arts and Crafts Act establishes a regime of government-owned
trademarks to represent and be used by Native American tribes, and
makes it illegal to "display for sale or sell[] a good. . . in a manner that
falsely suggests it is Indian produced." 35 Indigenous groups, including
Native Americans, can also use the traditional trademark regime to
protect their goodwill. Use of trademarks can "provide a link between
the customer and the manufacturer of the goods," and indicate to the
consumer that a particular good is authentic. 3 6
Some TCE proponents also seek to expand GI laws to include
protections for names or locations of indigenous communities. 3
Currently, the use of GI in the United States is very limited. American
Trademark law frowns upon an exclusive use of geography to enhance
good will. The Lanham Act prohibits the registration of marks that are
geographically descriptive or geographically deceptively "mis"-
descriptive (that is, the marks indicate a location inconsistent with the
product's actual location). However, subject to the United States'
membership in the World Trade Organization (WTO), certain wines
and spirits can be protected by geographical indicators. 39 Therefore, GI
protection does exist in the United States, and expanding it is
theoretically possible as a solution to protecting TCEs.
The trademark and GI regime does not carry the numerous issues
presented by using copyright to protect TCEs. Trademarks require no
originality and last in perpetuity. They also fit more in line with the idea
of communal ownership of TCE works, and are not author-specific.40
However, use of trademarks cannot satisfy the proponents of defensive
TCE rights. Trademarks do not prevent others from taking a certain
expression and changing it or disseminating it; they merely provide a
34 Id. See also, 17 U.S.C. §§ 302(b)-(c).
" 25 U.S.C. § 305e(b) (2012).
36 Ragavan, supra note 14, at 20.
37 Id
38 15 U.S.C. § 1052(e)-(f) (2012).
39 15 U.S.C. § 1052(a) (2012).
40 Ragavan, supra note 14, at 20.
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way to ensure authenticity, which gives the indigenous group a market
advantage for economic exploitation.
3. Trade Secret as TCE Protection
Providing trade secret-like protections for TCEs would promote
the goals of defensive TCE advocates. Trade secret law protects
knowledge that is relatively secretive from being wrongfully obtained.
That is, trade secret law "prevent[s] information . . . within the control
of a person from being disclosed to, acquired by, or used by others
without consent, in a manner contrary to honest commercial
practices." 41 One caveat, though, is that trade secret law recognized by
the Agreement on Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual Property
Rights (TRIPS) requires that the secret knowledge be of some
economic value.42 This is not a significant hurdle for scientific, medical,
and biodiversity forms of TK, but it may present problems for TCEs,
especially the forms of TCE that defensive proponents seek to keep out
of commercial markets entirely.
4 Sui Generis Protections and a Combination of Rights
Obviously, each current form of intellectual property has its own
shortfalls when it comes to protecting TCEs, so the best solution might
be to create an entirely new form of intellectual property right that
specifically applies to TCEs. One problem with this method is that it
could be more difficult to achieve international adoption of a
completely new form of intellectual property rights. 4 The best
alternative is to create an international treaty that combines various
rights from copyright, trademark, geographical indicator, and trade
secret laws and apply them specifically to TCEs in a comprehensive
agreement."
41 Ragavan, supra note 14, at 22. See also Deepa Varadarajan, A Trade Secret
Approach to Protecting Traditional Knowledge, 36 YALE J. INT'L L. 371, 397 (2011).
42 Varadarajan, supra note 41 at 396 ("Typically, trade secret law imposes three
basic requirements: (1) a broad subject matter requirement of information that derives
actual or potential economic value because it is not generally known; (2) the trade
secret holder took reasonable precautions under the circumstances to keep the
information secret; and (3) the defendant obtained the secret by violating an express
(e.g., contractual) or implied duty, or though other 'improper means."' (citing ROBERT
P. MERGES, PETER S. MENELL & MARK A. LEMLEY, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY IN THE
NEw TECHNOLOGICAL AGE 36-37 (5th ed. 2010))).
43 See Ragavan, supra note 14, at 25-27 (explaining that sui generis rights are
acceptable under TRIPS, but that to enforce such rights, trade restrictions may need to
be put into place, and it is not entirely clear how the World Trade Organization would
react to such restrictions).
" Id. at 23.
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Many scholars have discussed what should be included in a
comprehensive package of rights for TCEs and TK in general. 45
Professors Stephen Munzer and Kal Raustiala have identified what
they call a "robust package of legal protection for TK."46 This package
stipulates:
(1) An indigenous people holds their various claim-rights
and liberty-rights communally and has the power to
override or nullify some actions by their members.
(2) An indigenous people has a claim-right to...
b. Their folklore, folk art, crafts, techniques, and
knowledge; . . .
(3) An indigenous people has the power to create rules
binding on others for access to the items listed in (2),
including physical samples, and audio, visual, written, or
electronic records of these items.
(4) Individual members of an indigenous people have a
liberty-right and a power to grant access to the item listed
in (2) so long as the leaders of the indigenous people, or
the indigenous people acting as a whole, have not limited
this liberty-right and power.
(5) An indigenous people and its members have a claim-right
to receive just compensation for granting, after giving
informed consent, access to the items listed in (2).
(6) If just compensation is not received, or if prior informed
consent is not obtained, an indigenous people or its
members have a claim-right to, and a power to seek,
royalties, compensatory damages, and equitable relief,
and the state has a power and a duty to fine or prosecute
the offenders.
(7) With respect to copyrights ... protected by the laws of
host states or other states, an indigenous people and their
members have powers to
a. Exempt their folkloric works from the usual
copyright requirement of being fixed in a tangible
medium of expressions;
b. Prevent others from copyrighting or using their
45 See, e.g., Ragavan, supra note 14, at 23-25 (citing Doris Estelle Long, The
Impact of Foreign Investment on Indigenous Culture: An Intellectual Property
Perspective, 23 N.C. J. INT'L L. & COM. REG. 229 (1998), Dr. N. S. Gopalakrishnan,
Protection of TraditionalKnowledge- The Challenges, (Paper presented at the WIPO
Conference held at Peking University, Beijing, June 15, 1999), and David Downes,
How Intellectual Property Could be a Tool to Protect Traditional Knowledge, 25
COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 253, 258-59 (2000)).
46 Munzer and Raustiala, supra note 4, at 45-46.
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folkloric works;.. .
(8) An indigenous people has an immunity against
expropriation of the items listed in (2) by the host state.
The foregoing claim-rights, liberty-rights, powers, and
immunities are of indefinite duration, unless an
indigenous people exercise a liberty-right and power to
limit their duration with due appreciation of the
consequences.47
However, such a robust package of rights could prove quite
difficult to incorporate on an international level. Nonetheless, WIPO
has formulated its own draft of a comprehensive treaty, which includes,
in some form, each of the rights discussed by Munzer and Raustalia.
D. The WIPO Draft
The basic principles of the scope of protection of TCEs are laid
out in Article 3 of the WIPO Draft.48 Article 3 differentiates between
TCEs "of particular cultural or spiritual value or significance to a
community," and other TCEs. 4 9 The Draft deals with the problem of
subjectivity that comes along with this distinction by establishing a
registration process.so
Under the WIPO Draft, highly valued TCEs are given both
economic and moral copyright protections. 5 ' The economic rights
include the rights of reproduction, publication, adaptation, and
distribution, among others.52 The moral rights include attribution and
integrity. 53 The Draft also provides moral rights and trademark-like
protections to highly valued "words, signs, names and symbols," by
restricting any use of such TCE that "disparages, offends or falsely
suggests a connection with the community concerned, or brings the
community into contempt or disrepute."54 The WIPO Draft gives non-
highly valued TCEs moral rights similar to those of the highly valued
TCEs, but the economic rights are absent. 55 Each of the
aforementioned rights could theoretically be used offensively or
defensively, and each is subject to potential license agreements that
47 Id. Note, however, that Munzer and Raustalia ultimately reject such a robust
package of rights as being justifiable under traditional theories of property. Id.
48 The WIPO Draft, supra note 10 at Art. 3.
49 id
50 Id. at Art. 7.
51 Id. at Art. 3(a)(i).
52 id
53 Id. at Art. 3(a)(ii).
54 Id. at Art. 3(a)(ii).
55 Id. at Art. 3(b).
Traditional Cultural Expressions and the US Constitution
provide informed consent. 56 Finally, the draft provides trade secret
protection to any secret TCEs regardless of economic value.
Article 6 of the WIPO Draft establishes the term of protection
"for as long as the traditional cultural expressions/expressions of
folklore continue to meet the criteria for protection under Article 1.",58
Therefore, the protections envisioned in the WIPO Draft are indefinite,
much like standard trademark and trade secret protections, however
are unlike standard copyright protections, which last for the life of the
author plus 70 years.
The WIPO Draft provides exceptions and limitations to the
Article 3 rights in Article 5.59 These limitations first ensure that TCEs
can be used in their traditional manner within indigenous communities
according to community norms. 60 Next, these limitations provide
exceptions for teaching, research, criticism or review, reporting news,
use in legal proceedings, archival purposes, and incidental uses, as long
as attribution is still given and "such uses would not be offensive to the
relevant community." 61 These limitations are similar to the exceptions
and limitations in European copyright laws, and not far from the fair
use doctrine employed in the United States, but the requirement that
any exception not be offensive to the indigenous people is an idea that
is absent in American IP laws.
II. CONSTITUTIONALITY OF PROPOSED TCE
PROTECTIONS
The WIPO Draft and other proposed solutions for TCE
protection are generally considered to be some form of intellectual
property right. Therefore, in determining whether these solutions can
be implemented within the United States, it is necessary to determine
if such proposals fit within the confines of the IP Clause of the
Constitution. However, the IP Clause is not the exclusive source of
federal power for all forms of traditional intellectual property rights.
This part analyzes TCE proposals under both the IP Clause and the
Commerce Clause, but that is not the end of the analysis. The U.S.
Constitution enumerates powers to the federal government, but it also
limits the federal government. In order for an IP right to pass muster
under the Constitution, it must not violate First Amendment rights.
56 See id. Commentary for Art. 3.
5 Id. at Art. 3(c).
58 Id. at Art. 6.; see also, Id. at Art. 1; WIPO Draft, supra note 10 and accompanying
text.
5 Id. at Art. 5.
6 Id. at Art. 5(a)(i)-(ii).
61 Id. at Art. 5(a)(iii).
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Therefore, after considering whether TCE protections can be justified
by the IP Clause or the Commerce Clause, this part will determine
whether or not such protections infringe on the rights of speech and
religion.62
A. The IP Clause
Article 1, Section 8, Clause 8 of the U.S. Constitution provides for
the protection of intellectual property "[t]o promote the Progress of
Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and
Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and
Discoveries., 63 This is generally understood to be the source of power
for congress to establish copyright and patent laws. The clause includes
two limitations: "to promote the progress of Science and useful Arts,"
and "for limited Times." 6 However, some scholars, including the
authors of the leading treatise on copyrights, argue that the "to promote
progress" language of the IP Clause is merely a preamble and has no
impact on the power conferred to Congress, therefore, leaving "for
limited Times" as the only limitation on Congress's intellectual
property power. 5 I disagree, as do a majority of the circuits.6 6
Although the Supreme Court has not explicitly concluded that IP
laws must promote progress, multiple cases have included language
that suggests this to be the case. For example, in Graham v. John Deere,
the court stated in dicta that "Congress in the exercise of the patent
power may not overreach the restraints imposed by the stated
constitutional purpose," that purpose being to promote progress. 67
Furthermore, the court has rejected the "sweat of the brow" doctrine. 68
This doctrine is analogous to the Lockean labor theory of IP, which
62 Note that my analysis limits itself to considering whether current TCE proposals
would be valid federal law under the U.S. Constitution. It does not consider the
interplay between these proposals and currently enacted law. Such a discussion would
be very useful, but simply does not fit within the confines of this article.
63 U.S. CONST., art. 1, § 8.
64 See generally, Dotan Oliar, Making Sense of the Intellectual Property Clause:
Promotion of Progress as a Limitation on Congress's Intellectual Property Power, 84
GEO. L.J. 1771 (2006) (arguing that the IP Clause requires that any IP law passed by
congress be designed to promote progress).
65 1 MELVILLE B. NIMMER & DAVID NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 1.03
(2004).
6 Oliar, supra note 64, at 1782 (noting that only the 8th, 9th, and D.C. Circuits
follow the Nimmer approach).
67 383 U.S. 1, 5-8 (1966); see also, Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186 (2003) (hearing
arguments about why expanding copyright laws violate the "to promote progress"
limitation, but rejecting them without suggesting that IP laws need not promote
progress) (reaffirmed by Golan v. Holder, 132 S.Ct. 873, 888 (2012)).
6 FeistPubl'n, Inc., v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 349, 341 (1991).
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does not necessarily require a promotion of progress, but rather instills
IP rights in creations simply because of the labor that went into their
creation. 69 By rejecting this doctrine, the court underscored the
importance of promoting progress in granting intellectual property
rights. Accordingly, most scholars and most courts have concluded that
intellectual property laws in the United States must promote progress
and must provide rights for only a limited time.70 Both of these
limitations present concerns for protecting TCEs.
1. The "Promote Progress "Limitation
After a close scrutiny of the "promote progress" limitation, it does
not likely present a problem for offensive IP rights in TCEs, but it does
limit protection of defensive rights designed solely to limit access to
TCEs. At first glance, the requirement to promote progress seems to
be a difficult hurdle for TCE protection. Without IP rights for TCEs,
the TCEs are in the public domain, so giving those public domain
expressions new protections hardly seems to promote progress. Rather,
it simply creates a new right for already existing material. However, in
the recent case of Golan v. Holder the Supreme Court rejected this
reasoning, giving very strong deference to Congress in determining
whether a law promotes progress. 7 1 The Golan court stated that "[t]he
creation of at least one new work ... is not the sole way Congress may
promote knowledge and learning," and that "[n]othing in the text of the
Copyright Clause confines the 'Progress of Science' exclusively to
'incentives for creation."' 72
Applying the logic from Golan to offensive TCE rights is simple.
By receiving economic copyright-like protection, indigenous people
can freely distribute their authentic TCEs with less concern about
counterfeit goods taking a bite out of the market. A wider
dissemination of the traditional knowledge promotes the progress of
science and art by exposing more people to the knowledge throughout
the world. Therefore, offensive IP rights in TCEs do in fact promote
69 Justin Hughes, The Philosophy of Intellectual Property, 77 GEO. L.J. 287, 297-
300 (1988).
70 This is the foundation of the law and economics justification to IP laws, which is
conclusively the primary approach used in the United States. See William M. Landes
& Richard A. Posner, An Economic Analysis of Copyrights Law, 18 J. LEGAL STUD.
325 (1989). One contrary view is that IP laws do not promote progress at all. This is the
approach of the Access to Knowledge movement, but such a perspective is beyond the
scope of this paper. For an introduction to the Access to Knowledge movement, see
generally J.B., What is Access to Knowledge, BALKINIZATION (Apr. 21, 2006),
http://balkin.blogspot.com/2006/04/what-is-access-to-knowledge.html.
71 Golan, 132 S.Ct. at 888.
72 Id. at 874, 887.
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progress.
The analysis of defensive TCE rights is a bit more strained,
however. Defensive TCE advocates want to use IP rights to keep their
knowledge secret. In other words, they want to prevent their
knowledge from spreading, which would stifle progress rather than
promote it. Although the Supreme Court has stated that incentive to
create is not the only way to promote progress, it certainly did not
suggest that withholding knowledge could promote progress.
Throughout the Golan decision, the court emphasizes the importance
of dissemination as an alternative to incentive. 7 Accordingly,
copyright-like rights that do not encourage dissemination of any kind
or incentivize the creation of new works would clearly stifle progress
and accordingly have no place in an IP regime justified by the IP Clause
of the U.S. Constitution. I conclude, therefore, that copyright-like
protection could be used to promote some of the economic goals of the
offensive TCE rights group, but that no specific rights should be
designed to specifically block the spread of indigenous knowledge in
the way a defensive TCE right advocate might hope for (trade-secret-
like protection is another issue, and will be discussed infra).
2. The "Limited Times" Limitation
The second limitation in the IP Clause requires that IP rights last
only for limited times. 7 4 Anglo-American law and politics has long
maintained a strong hostility toward government-conferred
monopolies,7 5 so the limitation on the duration of copyrights is an
important one. This presents a serious problem for TCE proponents
who seek perpetual copyright-like protections.76 Simply put, if the IP
Clause is used as Congress's source of power to enact IP rights in TCEs
(and, logically, it most certainly should be for any copyright-like rights),
then those IP rights in TCEs cannot last indefinitely.
There is one argument that suggests that copyright-like rights
could last indefinitely, but the argument is weak and would not likely
hold up under a Constitutional analysis. Professor Landes and Judge
Posner have proposed that indefinitely renewable copyrights, rather
than perpetual copyrights, could in fact be Constitutional. Landes and
Posner point out that "limited" means "[a]ny time short of infinity,"
and that "even if 'limited' means something far short of infinity, this
7 Id. at 888.
74 U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8.
75 William M Landes & Richard A. Posner, Indefinitely Renewable Copyright, 70
U. CHI. L. REV. 471, 472 (2003).
76 See discussion supra Part I.B.2.
n Landes & Posner, supra note 69, at 472-73.
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limitation might conceivably be circumvented by allowing repeated
extensions of the copyright term."7 8 That is, the federal government
could theoretically provide an indefinite number of renewable
copyright terms for a single work because each term lasts for a limited
time. This reasoning is highly suspect, however, and even Landes and
Posner seem unsure of its plausibility.
In Eldred v. Ashcroft, the Supreme Court emphasized that the
entire intellectual property regime should be examined when
determining its constitutionality,80 so it seems unlikely that the court
would ignore the overall effect of IP laws when considering whether the
rights exist for limited times. The overall effect of a law that allows for
indefinite renewals of a copyright is an indefinite copyright. The
likelihood of a copyright being renewed indefinitely is greater when
that right is owned by a group, such as an indigenous community, rather
than an individual, who will eventually die. This type of copyright
would be unacceptable under the U.S. Constitution.
Furthermore, a plain text reading of the IP Clause and a historical
analysis support the claim that indefinite IP rights are unconstitutional.
If the words "for limited times" did not mean that IP rights could not
last indefinitely, then the words would be surplusage, and such a
reading would go against the traditional canons of statutory
construction.8 ' Congress has never questioned this interpretation. All
copyright and patent laws passed since the Constitution was ratified
have included finite durations. Therefore, based on textual and
historical analysis, and based on recent Supreme Court precedent, I
conclude that an indefinitely renewable copyright is not justifiable
under the IP Clause of the U.S. Constitution, and, accordingly,
copyright-like rights in TCEs cannot be maintained in perpetuity.
In sum, the Supreme Court has historically given strong deference
to Congress when ruling on the constitutionality of IP laws.8 2 The
ultimate rule derived from the IP Clause is that Congress may enact IP
laws as long as it holds a reasonable belief that those laws will promote
progress in some way, and as long as those laws do not provide
indefinite monopoly-like rights. The Court has explained that
"promote progress" should be read broadly to include incentives to
78 Id. at 472 (emphasis added).
79 Id. at 473 ("In any event, we are interested in the economics of indefinitely
renewing the copyright term and express no view on its legality").
8 Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 222 (2003) ("the Copyright Clause empowers
Congress to determine the intellectual property regimes that, overall, in that body's
judgment, will serve the ends of the Clause" (emphasis added)).
81 See, e.g., Alaska Dep't of Envtl. Conservation v. EPA, 540 U.S. 461, 489 n. 13
(2004) ("no clause, sentence, or word shall be superfluous, void, or insignificant").
82 See, e.g., Golan v. Holder, 132 S.Ct. 873, 889 (2012).
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create new works, incentives to disseminate works, or anything that
spreads knowledge.83 As discussed above, this understanding suggests
that Congress would have the power to create copyright-like rights in
TCEs without regards to the originality and fixation requirements in
traditional copyright law, but those rights must be designed with the
purpose of increasing the dissemination and spread of knowledge, and
they must not last indefinitely. Any rights that do not fit within these
restrictions must attempt to find justification elsewhere, such as the
Commerce Clause.
B. The Commerce Clause
Article 1 of the U.S. Constitution provides Congress with the
power to "regulate Commerce with foreign Nations, and among the
several States, and with the Indian Tribes." 8 This power could
conceivably be used to enact laws that provide IP rights. It is currently
the justification for trademark and trade secret laws, because those
regimes are highly commercial in nature. It is less clear, however,
whether it could be used to justify copyright-like protections. This
section will discuss which, if any, of the proposed TCE protections
could be justified by Commerce Clause powers.
1. Copyright-Like Rights Under the Commerce Clause
In their economic analysis of an indefinitely renewable copyright,
Professor Landes and Judge Posner explain that, perhaps Congress
could enact stronger, longer-lasting IP laws via this power. Such laws
certainly have some effect on commerce, after all. However, they all
but reject this argument because "the Framers clearly intended to limit,
as well as confer, congressional authority to grant patents and
copyrights."86 Professor Jeanne C. Fromer has analyzed this question
further, and concludes that "the IP Clause externally limits Congress
from using its other powers to promote the progress of science and
useful arts in ways that go beyond the IP Clause's means."87
81 Id. at 888.
8 U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8, cl. 3.
85 Landes & Posner, supra note 9, at 473.
86 id
87 Jeanne C. Fromer, The Intellectual Property Clause's External Limitations, 61
DUKE L.J. 1329, 1333 (2012). But see, Thomas B. Nachbar, Intellectual Property and
Constitutional Norms, 104 COLUM. L. REV. 272, 276-77 (2004) ("The Intellectual
Property Clause and its limits do not represent generally applicable constitutional
norms and Congress may therefore legislate pursuant to the Commerce Clause without
regard to the Intellectual Property Clause or its limits."). See also, William Patry, The
Enumerated Powers Doctrine and Intellectual Property: An Imminent Constitutional
Collision, 67 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 359, 364 (1999) (explaining that the IP Clause creates
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Professor Fromer explains that a textual analysis of the IP Clause
suggests that it imposes external limitations on Congress's other
powers, including the Commerce Clause.88 She explains that the means-
end structure ("to promote progress ... by securing exclusive rights")
would be superfluous and redundant if the language was not intended
to create external limitations. 89 Furthermore, the historical
understanding, judicial doctrine, and policy considerations all favor this
reading.9
Professor Fromer explains the framework for analyzing the
constitutionality of an IP law. 91 The first step is to determine whether
the law's function is to promote progress, or whether "it seeks to
encourage advancement in areas of systematic knowledge, including
cultural knowledge or technology."9 If the answer is yes, the law must
comply with the internal limitations of the IP Clause. However, in some
cases, a law might be functioning to promote progress, but at the same
time the law may have a second purpose.93 Fromer explains that:
If a law has multiple legitimate constitutional purposes, one of
which is to promote the progress of science and useful arts, it should be
presumed to be unconstitutional if it does not comply with the IP
Clause's means, unless there is clear and convincing evidence that
Congress has chosen to supersede those means because of overriding
interests pursuant to another legitimate constitutional power. 94
By applying Professor Fromer's framework, it is clear that one of
the overall goals of TCE protections is to promote progress in the areas
of cultural knowledge and cultural diversity, but secondary goals exist
as well, including protecting the human integrity of indigenous cultures.
However, this secondary goal has little to do with the commerce clause,
or any other enumerated right in Article 1 of the U.S. Constitution.
To conclude, the Commerce Clause likely cannot be used to
circumvent the internal limitations of the IP Clause in enacting TCE
legislation. Therefore, any copyright-like rights that are included in
such legislation (that is, providing exclusive rights in the TCEs to the
indigenous communities) must comply with the IP Clause limitations.
That is not to say, however, that the Commerce Clause cannot be used
two mutually exclusive rights-one of exclusivity for authors of certain works, and one
for the free copying of all other works- which cannot be circumvented by other Article
1 powers).
8 Fromer, supra note 48, at 1343.
89 Id. at 1362-63.
9 Id at 1369.
91 Id. at 1372.
92 Id. at 1374.
93 Id. at 1376.
94 Id. at 1379.
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to justify other rights in TCEs, such as trademarks or trade secret
protections.
2 TCE Trademarks and Geographical Indicators under the
Commerce Clause
There is little debate over the constitutionality of trademark law.
In the United States, trademark law is set forth in the Lanham Act,
which is based on the power to regulate commerce found in the
Commerce Clause. 95 As it stands now, U.S. trademark law can be
utilized by indigenous communities as a source indicator for their
TCEs. But trademarks can only be used in commerce, and therefore
they do little to promote the desires of defensive TCE proponents.
Furthermore, there are no moral rights in trademarks, moral rights are
generally derived from copyright and justified through the IP Clause,
not the Commerce Clause. However, the jurisprudence of trademark
law has been steadily expanding to resemble moral rights, which could
prove very useful for TCE proponents.
Professor Kenneth L. Port has argued that trademark law has been
expanding since the 1990s, and that with the passing of the Federal
Trademark Dilution Act in 1996, "trademark rights today have come
to resemble the moral rights of attribution and integrity." 96 However,
the strongest trademark protections currently exist only for registered
famous marks, and achieving such a status might not be plausible for
most indigenous communities. Trademark law as it stands now,
therefore, cannot provide all of the protections that TCE proponents
advocate for, but it can certainly support their cause to some degree. If
the Commerce Clause can justify the dilution doctrine for famous
marks, then it follows that the doctrine could be expanded to cover
cultural marks such as those used by Native Americans or other
indigenous communities, as long as the marks are similarly used in
commerce.
Geographical indicators work very much like trademarks, and are
likewise justified by the Commerce Clause. But GI law is very limited
in the United States (unlike in Europe, where it is quite expansive), as
it applies only in rare cases, mostly for certain wines and spirits. 98
95 U.S. Const. art. 1, sec. 8, cl. 3.
96 Kenneth L. Port, The Expansion Trajectory: Trademark Jurisprudence in the
Modern Age, 92 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. Soc'v 474, 477 (2010).
9 See id. at 489 (discussing famous marks' protection beyond likelihood of
confusion, and the incontestability of registered marks).
98 Margaret Ritzert, Champagne is from Champagne: An Economic Justification
forExtending Trademark-Level Protection to Wine-Related GeographicalIndicators,
37 AIPLA Q.J. 191,200 (2009).
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Nonetheless, there is no real constitutional burden to enacting broader
GI laws that could be used by indigenous communities.
3. Trade Secret Protection for TCEs under the Commerce
Clause
Like trademark law, trade secret protections are generally
justified by the commerce clause. Trade secrets are defined as "all
forms and types of financial, business, scientific, technical, economic, or
engineering information" that has been kept secret and "the
information derives independent economic value."" The connection to
interstate commerce is clear in this definition. Still, Professor Fromer
argues that trade secret law is constitutionally problematic in that it was
passed with the express intent "to protect a broader swath of material
in a manner akin to Congress's protection of patentable and
copyrightable material." 100 In fact, few scholars dispute that trade
secret laws and patent laws have the same goal.'o'
Whether or not Fromer's contention that trade secret law's
Commerce Clause interests do not supersede its IP Clause interests is
rights,102 it is clear that any trade secret must have economic value to
be protected. If trade secret law were to be extended to TCEs without
economic value such as those expressions for which indigenous
communities hope to exclude from dissemination, then the law would
be removed entirely from the Commerce Clause and fall within the IP
Clause where it would necessarily be confined by the IP Clause's
internal limitations. Therefore, trade secret law can provide little help
to advocates of defensive TCEs.
That is not to say that trade secret law absolutely cannot provide
any defensive TCE protection. In Bridge Publications, Inc. v. Vien, the
Court found that the sacred texts and "advanced technology" created
by L. Ron Hubbard for the church of Scientology qualified for trade
secret protections. 103 However, in Religious Technology Center v.
Lerma, the Court held that the "advanced technology" did not "provide
plaintiff with any economic advantage over any competitors," and
therefore did not qualify for trade secret protection. 104 In Bridge
Publications, the Court seemed to assume that the church's knowledge
had economic value without actually analyzing the issue.'0o These two
99 18 U.S.C. § 1839(3) (2006).
10n Fromer, supra note 301, at 1393 (citing S. Rep. No. 104-359, at 2 (1996)).
'01 Id. at 1394.
'0 Id at 1395.
103 Bridge Publ'ns, Inc. v. Vien, 827 F.Supp. 629, 633 (S.D. Cal. 1993).
'(' Religious Tech. Ctr. v. Lerma, 897 F.Supp. 260, 266 (E.D. Va. 1995).
105 See Bridge Publns, supra note 103, at 633 (Court makes no mention of economic
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cases suggest that it might be possible to find economic value in works
like TCEs, but they also present serious doubts. When a community
intends to keep information private, and that information is not
somehow related to a product or service that the community
disseminates to the public, it is difficult to find an economic value in the
secret information. However, it still might be possible to justify a fair
compensation for the use of TCEs that are otherwise not a part of
commerce.
4. Compensation for TCE Use under the Commerce Clause
One important aspect of many TCE proposals is that indigenous
communities receive just compensation for the use of their TCEs. Such
protections are essentially built into the copyright-like rights through
the control of reproduction and dissemination with the option of
licensing the right. But compensation could theoretically arise outside
of the copyright context as well, and since money would be changing
hands, a law that ensures just compensation can likely be justified under
the Commerce Clause.
As discussed above, the problem with providing trade secret
protection to TCEs that are not a part of commerce is that they have
no economic value. However, if those TCEs were misappropriated in
such a way that created an economic gain for the appropriator, then the
economic value argument is moot. It follows, then, that the indigenous
community who created the appropriated TCE should be compensated
for the use of that TCE if the use creates economic value. This could be
in the form of a royalty equal to a certain percentage of the
appropriator's economic gain. Unfortunately, if an individual
misappropriates a TCE that is not in commerce and uses it in such a
way that has no economic value, there may be no grounds for
compensation under the Commerce Clause.
Ultimately, I conclude that the Commerce Clause likely cannot be
used to circumvent the limitations of the IP Clause. It may be possible
to argue that protecting cultural integrity relates tangentially to
commerce, but such an argument would be quite strained, and difficult
to support in today's restrictionist view of the Commerce Clause. At
the same time, however, the Commerce Clause can create numerous
rights for TCEs that are used in commerce, including trademark, trade
secret, and just compensation for use.
value in the "advanced technology").
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C. First Amendment Limitations on TCE Protections
All federal laws are subject to the freedom of speech and freedom
of religion. Therefore, any TCE-protection regime must be carefully
constructed to ensure that these two rights are not infringed. This
section will discuss how proposed TCE rights might not comply with
these two rights and how the proposals can be modified to ensure
compliance.
1. Freedom of Speech
Various litigants have attempted, unsuccessfully, to argue that
expansive copyright laws infringe on the freedom of speech. 106
However, in Harper andRow v. Nation, the Supreme Court noted that
copyright has historically been considered an "engine of free
expression."10 7 The Court has recognized that copyright law does in fact
limit one's ability to express himself. The Court held that copyright law
is designed with safeguards to ensure compliance with the First
Amendment, including the "idea/expression dichotomy" and the "fair
use" defense.os TCE rights, likewise, must include similar provisions to
avoid infringing the First Amendment.
The "idea/expression dichotomy" is codified in § 102(b) of the
Copyright Act, which states that "[i]n no case does copyright
protection ... extend to any idea, procedure, process, system, method
of operation, concept, principle, or discovery regardless of the form in
which it is described, explained, illustrated, or embodied in such
work." 109 Such a limitation applied to TCEs would not have a
significant impact, as it is the actual art or expression that proponents
of TCE rights seek to protect; not the ideas behind them. In some
instances, however, a TCE may have a certain spiritual meaning that is
thought to have a purpose beyond the physical expression. In those
cases, an "idea/expression dichotomy" limitation might provide less
protection than the indigenous community wants. But those particular
forms of expression might be eligible for other forms of TK laws
designed to protect procedures or processes more like patents.
Therefore, by adding a provision similar to § 102(b), TCE protection is
106 See, e.g., Golan v. Holder, 132 S.Ct. 873, 889 (2012) (holding that the First
Amendment does not inhibit the expansion of copyright law).
107 Harper & Row Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 558 (1985).
108 Id. at 556 ("idea/expression dichotomy strike[s] a definitional balance between
the First Amendment and the Copyright Act by permitting free communication of facts
while still protecting an author's expression"); see also Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S.
186, 219 (2003) ("fair use defense affords considerable latitude for scholarship and
comment,.. . even for parody").
109 17 U.S.C. § 102(b) (2012).
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less likely to infringe on the freedom of speech while having little
impact on protectable expressions.
The fair use exception is codified in § 107 of the Copyright Act,
which states that "[t]he fair use of a copyrighted work, including such
use by reproduction in copies ... for purposes such as criticism,
comment, news reporting, teaching... , scholarship, or research, is not
an infringement of copyright." n0 A similar list of limitations and
exceptions in a TCE law is absolutely crucial to ensure that the law
complies with the First Amendment even though it may open up the
TCE to uses that indigenous communities disfavor.
To conclude, just as copyright law does not violate the First
Amendment Freedom of Speech clause, a well-crafted TCE regime
would be Constitutional. This means that TCE rights must be limited
by an "idea/expression dichotomy" and an adequate fair use defense.
However, even if these limitations are included, a TCE regime still risks
violating the First Amendment if it is not crafted in such a way that
avoids infringing the Freedom of Religion.
2. Freedom of Reigion
In addition to the freedom of speech, the First Amendment
includes the Establishment Clause, which provides that "Congress shall
make no law respecting an establishment of religion.""' This is a very
important right, as the American Colonies were founded with the
purpose of practicing religions that faced persecution in Europe.
Furthermore, it is a contentious issue in the United States, and an
indigenous community could face increased litigation challenging its
TCE rights if there is even an appearance of unequal treatment of
religions.
In 1971, The Supreme Court established the Lemon Test to
determine whether a law violated the Establishment Clause: "[F]irst,
the statute must have a secular legislative purpose; second, its principal
or primary effect must be one that neither advances nor inhibits
religion; finally, the statute must not foster 'an excessive government
entanglement with religion."'1 12 This test has moved slightly out of
favor, but has not been overruled and is still the test for the
Establishment Clause.113
110 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2012).
111 U.S. CONST. amend. 1.
112 Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 612-13 (1971).
113 See Jed Michael Silversmith & Jack Achiezer Guggenheim, Between Heaven
and Earth: The Interrelationship Between Intellectual Property Rights and the
Religion Clauses of the First Amendment, 52 ALA. L. REV. 467, 470 (2001); see also
Religious Organizations and the Law § 10:43, The First Amendment- The
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Facially, no TCE proposals seem to run against the Lemon Test,
but there could be a problem in cases where highly spiritual TCEs are
specifically given greater protection than other TCEs. In such a case,
the TCE regime could potentially violate the second step of the Lemon
Test by having an effect that advances or inhibits a religion. For
example, if indefinite protection is given to the sacred texts of one
religion,114 and another religion wished to use part of those texts but
was prevented from doing so, then the first religion would be advanced
by the TCE laws while the second one would be inhibited, clearly
violating the Lemon Test. This unfortunate scenario is the subject of
the case United Chistian Scientists v. Christian Science Board of
Directors."5
In Christian Scientists, the founder of the defendant church, Mary
Baker Eddy, wrote what would become the church's sacred text,
"Science and Health with Key to the Scriptures."116 In 1971, the church
lobbied Congress to pass a private law conveying a special copyright
protection on all editions of the text that would last for "seventy-five
years from the effective date of [the] Act or from the date of first
publication, whichever is later." 1 17 The purpose of the private law was
to ensure the integrity of the church's sacred texts." 8 Then, in 1985, a
splinter denomination, the United Christian Scientists, wanted to use
the protected work and challenged the Constitutionality of the private
copyright. The court agreed that the law was unconstitutional, stating
that "Private Law 92-60 confers upon a religious body an unusual
measure of copyright protection by unusual means, and in a fashion that
interjects the federal government into internal church disputes over the
authenticity of religious texts." 1 9 The court concluded that the law
advanced one church's cause over another and was therefore
unconstitutional. 1 20
The primary difference between the law in Christian Scientists and
the proposals for TCE protections is that the Christian Scientists law
applied to a single religion, whereas TCE rights theoretically apply to
all cultures and religions. This is certainly a significant distinction, and
Establishment Clause (2012).
114 Based on the WIPO Draft definition of TCE, it is likely that any religion could
probably claim TCE protection for their sacred texts.
11 (Christian Scientists l) 829 F.2d 1152 (1986).
116 United Christian Scientists v. Christian Sci. Bd. Of Dirs. Of First Church of
Christ, Sci. (Christian Scientistsl), 616 F. Supp. 476, 477 (D.D.C. 1985).
117 Priv. L. No. 92-60, 85 Stat. 857 (1971).
118 S. Rep. No. 280, 92 Cong., 1st Sess. 2 (1971); H.R. Rep. No. 604, 92d Cong., 1st
Sess. 3 (1971).
119 Christian Scientists II, 829 F.2d at 1159.
120 Id at 1171.
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it is likely enough to allow a TCE law to avoid a facial infringement of
the first amendment. However, it is easy to foresee a situation where
TCE rights could be appliedin a manner that leads to the same result
as in Christian Scientists. This would be an undesirable outcome, but
would not necessarily invalidate the rights for all purposes. In fact,
standard copyright law has been used in similar situations without being
declared unconstitutional under the Establishment Clause.
In Worldwide Church of God v. Philadelphia Church of God, the
plaintiff asserted copyright over a text it had previously used in its
religious observances so as to prevent the defendant splinter group
from using that text.12 1 However, in Worldwide, the book at issue was
copyrighted under traditional copyright law, which makes no mention
of religion whatsoever. By enacting a law that differentiates between
works of a high spiritual value and other works, as some TCE proposals
do, Congress would be stepping into dangerous territory that could be
perceived as promoting the practice of a religion. Although it is not
entirely clear, such a perception could be enough to violate the Lemon
Test. Therefore, I conclude that any TCE law might be easier to pass if
it is tailored in such a way that applies evenly to all works regardless of
spiritual nature.
III. PROPOSED FRAMEWORK FOR TCE PROTECTIONS
The above analysis makes it clear that any Federal IP rights in
TCE in the United States will be significantly limited by the restrictions
of the Constitution. Numerous protections sought by proponents of
TCE rights simply do not fit within the confines of the Constitution.
This does not mean that there is no room for TCE rights in American
law; it merely means that such rights must be limited. This part analyses
the proposed solutions discussed in Part I with an emphasis on the
approach of the WIPO Draft, based on the conclusions made about
constitutional law made in Part II.
A. Distinctions Between Spiritual and Non-Spiritual Works
Should be Disfavored
In the WIPO Draft, WIPO provides greater protection for TCEs
"of particular cultural or spiritual value or significance to a
community." 122 While this does not pose a certain Establishment
Clause problem, it could at the very least lead to litigation on the
subject, which could prove costly for indigenous communities trying to
121 Worldwide Church of God v. Phila. Church of God, Inc., 227 F.3d 1110 (9th Cir.
2000).
122 See WIPO Draft, supra note 10, art 3(a).
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protect their TCEs. This problem can easily be avoided by removing
the word "spiritual" from the draft. This way, TCEs that are
particularly culturally valuable will still receive the greater protection
without the appearance of promoting religion. Naturally, TCEs of great
spiritual value to a community also have great cultural value for that
community, so the same works would likely receive the greater
protections, and as long as the law is applied evenly, it should not run
against the Establishment Clause, even though it will provide
protection to sacred texts and other spiritual works.12 3
B. Offensive Rights Should be Favored over Defensive Rights
Unfortunately for many proponents of IP rights in TCEs, there is
little legal room for specific defensive rights. As discussed above,
copyright-like rights are limited to uses designed to promote progress
through incentivizing creation, incentivizing dissemination, or
spreading knowledge in some way. 124 Strictly defensive rights do
exactly the opposite.
The commerce clause cannot help defensive rights much either,
because it can only be applied to regulations with some sort of
connection to commerce. Trademark and geographical indicator laws
only apply to goods and services in commerce, and trade secret law
requires that the secret knowledge have an economic value in order to
receive protection. If, however, an indigenous tribe wishes to keep a
certain TCE secret, and it can prove that that TCE has economic value
as a secret, then there may be room for defensive trade secret
protection. 12 5 Of course, if the TCEs are misappropriated and used for
economic gains by a third party, there is likely a trade secret claim to
be made, but if the TCEs are merely used for non-economic purposes -
even if those purposes offend the indigenous community-the trade
secret claim may be difficult to prove. Ultimately, though, trade secret
law as it stands already protects TCEs with economic value, and it
cannot be altered to include TCEs without economic value, so any new
law designed to protect TCEs need not include explicit trade secret
protections.
It is also important to note that just because the IP Clause and the
Commerce Clause cannot be used to provide express defensive rights
123 Seee.g., Intellectual Reserve, Inc. v. Utah Lighthouse Ministry, Inc., 75
F.Supp.2d 1290 (D. Utah 1999) (upholding the copyright in sacred texts of the Church
of Jesus Christ and the Latter-day Saints); Worldwide Church of God v. Phila. Church
of God, Inc., 227 F.3d 1110 (9th Cir. 2000) (finding copyright infringement when
splinter church used original church's copyrighted sacred texts).
124 See discussion supra Section II. B.1.
125 See, supra notes 103-105 and accompanying text.
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to protect TCEs, this does not mean that indigenous communities who
seek defensive rights are completely out of luck. General copyright-like
protections, if provided to TCEs, can still be used defensively even
though they are designed for offensive protection.' 26
C The Term of Protection for Most Rights Should be Limited
Perhaps the greatest issue in implementing TCE protections is the
proposed unlimited term of the rights. This simply is not possible for
certain rights under U.S. Constitutional law. Any right derived from the
IP Clause-namely patent and copyright-like rights that are designed
to promote the progress of science and useful arts-must be limited in
their duration. Of course, it is possible to argue that perpetual TCE
rights only last until the TCEs are no longer used by their creators.
Science suggests that humans will not exist forever, and a particular
indigenous community will probably last an even shorter amount of
time, but anything short of infinite is obviously not what the Framers
had in mind when they used the phrase "limited times" in the IP Clause.
Accordingly, these rights should be limited to a finite term such as 100
years or less.127
Rights derived from the Commerce Clause are not subject to the
"limited times" requirement, however. Therefore, any trademark-like
rights can last perpetually. Furthermore, some limited moral rights
resemble trademark rights, so based on an expansive view of trademark
law, some limited moral rights might be able to last perpetually.128
D. WIPO Draft Revisions
The WIPO Draft includes very expansive TCE rights. Although
such expansive rights would be more pleasing to indigenous
communities than a more restrained TCE regime, a more restrained
regime is more likely to gain support by developed nations that are
126 See, e.g., Worldwide Church of God v. Philadelphia Church of God, Inc., 227
F.3d 1110, (9th Cir. 2000) (finding copyright infringement when splinter church used
original church's copyrighted sacred texts). In Worldwide, the original church wanted
to prevent the use of its copyrighted texts because the texts contained viewpoints that
the church no longer held to, so the church was asserting defensive copyright
protections. Id
127 This is, admittedly, an arbitrary duration, but anything greater than around 150
years would be unprecedented (though still arguably finite). Currently, a traditional
copyright lasts until 70 years after the author's death, which could theoretically be a
total of 150 years for a young author (or perhaps even longer, but certainly not much
longer, its hard to imagine a copyright lasting as long as 170 years). A second option
might be to allow a finite number of renewals for a finite term such as 10, 25, or 50
years.
128 See, supra notes 95-97 and accompanying text.
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accustomed to TCEs being in the public domain. The first changes that
should be made to the WIPO Draft to align the proposal with U.S.
Constitutional law are those mentioned in the previous two sections:
remove the word "spiritual" from Article 3 of the draft, and limit the
duration in Article 6.
The duration limitation, however, need only apply to the article
3(a)(i) rights, which are the copyright-like rights. 129 Article 3(a)(ii)
rights are more analogous to trademarks and therefore entitled to
perpetual protection as long as they are used in commerce. 130 But in
order to ensure that 3(a)(ii) is not too broad in this respect, 3(a)(ii)
should be modified so as only to apply to TCEs used in commerce. This
is certainly a blow to defensive TCE advocates, but it is necessary under
Constitutional law. The rights in Article 3(b)(i)-(iii) are strictly moral
rights, which are tangentially related to both copyright and trademark
law. The United States has very limited moral rights in copyright law,
and it is not entirely obvious that those rights derive from the IP Clause,
but they probably do. Therefore, in order for these 3(b) rights to last
perpetually, they must also be applied only to TCEs in commerce so as
to resemble the trademark rights of source-recognition and dilution.
Article 3(b)(iv) is not clearly a copyright-like right because it does not
provide exclusivity to the owner of the right, it is therefore probably
acceptable as is, justified by the commerce clause, as it can only possibly
apply to works in commerce.
The WIPO Draft provides trade secret-like protection in Article
3(c). As discussed above, this is unnecessary and should be removed
from the draft. 131 Trade secret law can only be justified by the
commerce clause, and therefore can apply only to works in
commerce.13 2 That is not to say that indigenous tribes cannot keep their
TCEs secret, but unfortunately they will not have the support of the law
in the case of the misappropriation of those secrets.
Finally, one of the most significant changes that must be made to
the WIPO Draft is in the exceptions and limitations provision. A
thorough exceptions and limitations provision is necessary to comply
with the First Amendment freedom of expression. 133 As it stands,
Article 5 of the WIPO Draft provides an adequate number of
exceptions, but it includes a provision that severely limits expression.
Article 5(a)(iii) states that in order for the exceptions and limitations
to apply to a particular use, that use must "not be offensive to the
129 WIPO Draft, supra note 10, at art. 3(a)(i).
130 Id. at art. 3(a)(ii); see also, supra notes 95-99 and accompanying text.
131 See, supra notes 99-105 and accompanying text.
132 id
133 See, supra notes 106-110 and accompanying text.
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relevant community."134 This provision should be struck from the draft.
U.S. fair use law does not consider the potential "offensive"
nature of a fair use because one of the important exceptions to
copyright law is "criticism," and criticism will almost always offend the
copyright owner. Likewise, TCE limitations must leave room for
criticism that offends. If the "not be offensive to the relevant
community" language were to be left in a statute, then speech would be
drastically hampered. For example, an individual may wish make a
political cartoon criticizing the politics of a Native American tribe. To
do so, he may need to use a symbol that belongs to the tribe in order to
express his criticism. He may even use that symbol in a manner that is
embarrassing to the tribe in order to emphasize his point. This would
not fall under the fair use limitation under the current WIPO Draft.
The result would be similar to blasphemy charges common in some
parts of the world but quite foreign to the United States.135This would
be an unacceptable result in the United States. In conclusion, in order
to ensure the possibility of criticism, a TCE fair use exception cannot
prevent uses that offend the relevant community if they would
otherwise be acceptable.
CONCLUSION
TCE rights are a difficult issue. It is not even entirely clear that
TCE rights should exist. But assuming they should, this article has
concluded that such rights can be implemented in the United States if
carefully crafted and sufficiently limited in scope. A U.S. Constitutional
perspective shows that rights justified by the Commerce Clause,
including trademarks, GIs, and a right of just compensation for use are
the best solutions for perpetual TCE protection. Other rights that are
derived from the IP Clause can also be useful, but only for limited
durations. And finally, In order to ensure that TCE protections do not
infringe on First Amendment Rights, they must avoid religious
terminology such as a distinction between spiritual and non-spiritual
and include a strong fair use exception.
134 WIPO Draft, supra note 10, at art. 5(a)(iii).
135 See, e.g., Blasphemy charges Filed Over Gay Jesus Play in Greece, REUTERS
(Nov. 16, 2012) (explaining that many believe these Greece's blasphemy laws to be
comparable to the dark ages) available at
http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/11/16/greece-blasphemy-
idUSL5E8MG94D20121116.
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APPENDIX A - LINE EDITED WIPO
The Following is a line edited version of the relevant provisions of
the WIPO Draft discussed in this article. The changes relate to my
proposed framework in Part III that are necessary for compliance with
U.S. Constitutional law. Strike-through indicates words that should be
struck from the text and [bracketed text] indicates additions.
ARTICLE 1: SUBJECT MATTER OF PROTECTION
[no changes]
ARTICLE 2: BENEFICIARIES
[no changes]
ARTICLE 3: ACTS OF MISAPPROPRIATION (SCOPE OF
PROTECTION)
Traditional cultural expressions/expressions of folklore of
particular value or significance
(a) In respect of traditional cultural expression/expressions of
folklore of particular cultural e-spiritual- value or sinificance to a
community, and which have been registered or notified as referred to
in Article 7, there shall be adequate and effective legal and practical
measures to ensure that the relevant community can prevent the
following acts taking place without its free, prior and informed consent:
(i)in respect of such traditional cultural expressions/expressions of
folklore other than words, signs, names and symbols:
the reproduction, publication, adaptation, broadcasting, public
performance, communication to the public, distribution, rental, making
available to the public and fixation (including by still photography) of
the traditional cultural expressions/expressions of folklore or
derivatives thereof;
any use of the traditional cultural expressions/expressions of
folklore or adaptation thereof which does not acknowledge in an
appropriate way the communityas the source of the traditional cultural
expressions/expressions of folklore;
any distortion, mutilation or other modification of, or other
derogatory action in relation to, the traditional cultural expressions/
expressions of folklore; and
the acquisition or exercise oflPrights over the traditional cultural
expressions/expressions of folklore or adaptations thereof,
(ii)in respect of words, signs, names and symbols which are such
traditional cultural expressions/expressions of folklore [and used in
commercej, any use of the traditional cultural expressions/expressions
of folklore or derivatives thereof or the acquisition or exercise of IP
rights over the traditional cultural expressions/expressions of folklore
or derivatives thereof, which disparages, offends or falsely suggests a
connection with the community concerned, or brings the community
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into contempt or disrepute;
Other traditional cultural expressions/expressions of folklore
(b)In respect of the use and exploitation of other traditional
cultural expressions/expressions of folklore [used in commerce, and]
not registered or notified as referred to in Article 7, there shall be
adequate and effective legal andpractical measures to ensure that.
()the relevant community is identified as the source of any work
or other production adapted from the traditional cultural expression!
expression of folklore;
(ii)any distortion, mutilation or other modification of, or other
derogatory action in relation to, a traditional cultural expressions/
expression of folklore can be prevented and/or is subject to civil or
criminal sanctions;
(ih)any false, confusing or misleading indications or allegations
which, in relation to goods or services that refer to, draw upon or evoke
the traditional cultural expression/expression of folklore of a
community, suggest any endorsement by or linkage with that
community, can be prevented and/or is subject to civil or criminal
sanctions; and
#iV)
[Compensation for Gainful Uses
(c) ]where the use or exploitation-isforgainfulintent, there should
be equitable remuneration or benefit-sharing on terms determined by
the Agency referred to in Article 4 in consultation with the relevant
community-ad
(c)Teres sha be adequate and ffes/ egol and pra
measxres to ensur that tiliuzits haE the means to prevent the
of LD rxkhts ovr seetraditionaluorpcustomary of
feflwem.
ARTICLE 4: MANAGEMENT OF RIGHTS
[no changes]
ARTICLE 5: EXCEPTIONS AND LIMITATIONS
Measures for the protection of TCEs/EoF should
(i)extend only to utilizations of TCEs/EoF taking place outside the
traditional or customary context, whether or not for commercial gain;
and,
(i) extend only to utilization of TCEs/EoF takingplace outside the
traditional or customary context, whether or not for commercial gain;
and
(iii)not apply to utilizations of TCEs/EoFin the following cases:
by way of illustration for teaching and learning;
non-commercial research or private study;
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criticism or revie w;
reporting news or current events;
use in the course of legal proceedings;
the making of recordings and other reproductions of TCEs/EoF
for purposes of their inclusion in an archive or inventory for non-
commercial cultural heritage safeguarding purposes; and
incidental uses,
provided in each case that such uses are compatible with fair
practice, the relevant community is acknowledged as the source of the
TCEs/EoF where practicable and possibleand-such usesw d b
offensive- to the reimat -omm unit
(b)Measures for the protection of TCEs/EoF could allow, in
accordance with custom and traditional practice, unrestricted use of the
TCEs/EoF, or certain of them so specified, by all members of a
community, including all nationals of a country.
ARTICLE 6: TERM OF PROTECTION
[Protection of the rights descibed in Article 3(a)(i) should endure
for 100 years from the date of registration according to the formalities
described in Article 7.]
Protection of [all other ights pertaining to] traditional cultural
expressions/expressions of folklore should endure for as long as the
traditional cultural expressions/expressions of folklore continue to
meet the criteria for protection under Article 1 of these provisions, and,
(i~jg so far as TfsE~r re toin Artice 3(a) amreconeredt4
theftprtection under tha su ari shall endurge -fo-r so lon-Rg as thej,
reminreiserd or notified as -refe-rePd to Jin Aitiek 7, ad
(iiin so far as seeret T~/o are concerned, theftpreoetioqn
suc-h shall enRdtre for se ong as the' reminsecet
ARTICLE 7: FORMALITIES
[no change]
ARTICLE 8: SANCTIONS, REMEDIES, AND EXERCISE OF
RIGHTS
[no change]
ARTICLE 9: TRANSITIONAL MEASURES
[no change]
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